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 Imagine that your digital video recorder (“DVR”) lived in the “clouds”1 and 
offered the possibility of unlimited storage space for your recorded programs.2 As 
early as 2005, experts were predicting that network-DVRs would significantly impact 
the cable television industry.3 Today, the Set-Top Storage DVR (“STS-DVR”) is the 
preferred medium for television viewers to record their favorite programs and play 
them back at a later, more convenient time.4 The STS-DVR is a device that sits on 
top of the viewer’s television set and utilizes an internal hard drive to store recorded 
programs.5 A network-DVR system, in contrast, offers viewers the ability to record 
and store content in the “clouds,” i.e., on reliable, industrial strength servers, centrally 
located at the cable company’s data center.6 Network-DVR hardware is more reliable 
and less costly to maintain than STS-DVR hardware.7 In March 2006, Cablevision 
1. “Cloud computing” is a term used to describe a recent computing trend whereby data is stored on remote 
servers and accessed with a web browser and a connection to the Internet. See Steve Lohr, Gates Departs, 
and Microsoft Seeks Path Beyond His Legacy, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2008, at A1 (discussing the shift from 
traditional desktop software to software “accessed with a Web browser and delivered over the Internet 
from vast data centers.”).
2. See Brian Stelter, A Ruling May Pave the Way For Broader Use of DVR, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2008, at C8 
(quoting Craig E. Moffett, an analyst at an investment research firm, who called Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
a DVR that has a “very long cord”); see also Next Inning Technology Announces Investment Opinion, Updates 
Outlooks for Seagate Technology, EZchip Semiconductor, NetLogic Microsystems, Garmin, and SiRF 
Technology, Business Wire, Aug. 6, 2008, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/
is_2008_August_6/ai_n27971818/?tag=content;col1 (quoting Paul McWilliams, Next Inning Technology 
Research Editor in Chief who said, “What makes this interesting and precedent-setting is that if the 
[Cablevision] case stands, it basically sets the precedent that we can own storage space remote from our 
home and from a legal perspective it is viewed the same as if it were in our home.”).
3. See Mike Shields, Next Wave: Network DVRs, Mediaweek, Mar. 28, 2005, available at http://www.
allbusiness.com/services/business-services-miscellaneous-business/4762924-1.html (predicting that 
network-DVR use will dramatically increase DVR usage among cable television subscribers because, 
according to a Magna Global report, it “would immediately make time-shifting technology available to 
40 [percent] to 50 percent of a cable operator’s subscribers . . . significantly impacting how video content 
is consumed.”); see also Charles Hall, The Case for Network DVRs, The Online Reporter, Oct. 21, 
2006, http://www.onlinereporter.com/article.php?article_id=7959.
4. See Jacqueline Renfrow, Consumer Ability to Skip Ads Could Get Easier, Response, Sept. 1, 2008, available 
at http://www.response-digital.com/response/200809/?pg=16#pg17. A report from September 2008 
lists STS-DVR use at nearly one quarter of all television households. See id. (“[A]bout 26 million homes, 
23.4 percent of all TV households, had DVRs, and nearly 30 percent of digital set-top boxes and DVRs 
were installed in 2007 with at least one other set-top box already in operation.”).
5. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 611–12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007), rev’d in part, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
6. See Hall, supra note 3; see also Matt Stump, Digital Recording Comes Out of the Box: Cablevision Set to 
Light Up a Networked System, Multichannel News, Mar. 27, 2006 (“Cablevision Systems Corp. is 
launching a groundbreaking technical trial today (March 27), in which its subscribers will record TV 
shows and movies on servers in its network, rather than on the set-top box in their homes.”).
7. See Hall, supra note 3 (making the point that STS-DVR boxes are “noisy, heat-generating and less 
reliable,” while network-DVRs would eliminate the need to install STS-DVRs in the home and thus, 
lower the cost for both the cable company and subscriber); see also Stump, supra note 6 (noting that 
Cablevision “will never have to send out an installer in a truck to set up, fix or replace recording 
equipment in customer homes”).
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Systems Corporation, one of the cable companies leading the charge toward network-
DVRs, introduced its new “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder System 
(“RS-DVR”).8 In response, content copyright owners sued Cablevision, alleging 
copyright infringement.9 Striking a blow to the content owners, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit effectively gave Cablevision the green light 
to roll out RS-DVR without the need for an additional license.
 In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit reversed 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s (“District 
Court”) grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated an injunction 
against the defendant Cablevision.10 Judge John M. Walker, writing for a unanimous 
panel, held that Cablevision would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive rights to 
reproduce and publicly perform their works under the Copyright Act.11 This case 
comment contends that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Copyright Act’s 
definition of “public performance” departs from the statutory language and prior 
Circuit Court decisions interpreting the same provisions. It also departs from a 
pragmatic approach in favor of a strict, formalistic analysis of the “public performance” 
issue. As a result, the court’s holding legitimizes an inefficient use of technology as 
an end-run around copyright liability.
 A more detailed explanation of the RS-DVR technology is helpful to understand 
the courts’ analyses. To deliver content to subscribers, cable companies gather 
programming from content providers at their “head-end”12 and transmit a single data 
8. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. Cablevision was the first major cable television company to announce 
a network-DVR system that would offer its customers the ability to record and store programs remotely 
on centrally located servers. See Hall, supra note 3.
9. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123. Cablevision Systems Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
CSC Holdings, Inc., were named defendants in the complaint. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d 
at 609. Plaintiffs alleged that Cablevision’s proposed RS-DVR system “would directly infringe their 
copyrights both by making unauthorized reproductions, and by engaging in public performances, of 
their copyrighted works.” Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123.
10. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123.
11. Id. The right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonerecords,” and “in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission,” are two 
of the six exclusive rights granted to copyright owners under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2006).
12. A “head-end,” as defined by the Federal Communications Commission, is:
 [T]he origination point for signals in the cable system. It has parabolic or other 
appropriately shaped antennas for receiving satellite-delivered program signals, high-
gain directional antennas for receiving distant TV broadcast signals, directional 
antennas for receiving local signals, machines for playback of taped programming and 
commercial insertion, and studios for local origination and community access 
programming.
 In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner 
Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6572 n.187 (2001) (quoting Walter Ciciora et al., Modern 
Cable Television Technology 12 (1999)).
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stream in real time into homes via coaxial cable.13 However, with RS-DVR, 
Cablevision splits this single stream of data into two streams: the first is transmitted 
to subscribers in real time, and the second is sent to the RS-DVR system.14 The 
second stream of data moves to the RS-DVR’s first buffer, where it remains for 1.2 
seconds while Cablevision’s computers determine whether any individual subscriber 
has requested a recording of the program.15 If the computer receives a recording 
request, the data stream is then sent to a second buffer, from which the program is 
copied to the individual subscriber’s hard drive storage space.16 Data residing in the 
buffers is automatically erased and overwritten as new data f lows into the buffers.17 
Absent any recording requests from the individual subscribers, data in the second 
stream is never permanently captured by the RS-DVR.18
 To the end user, Cablevision’s proposed RS-DVR service functions much like the 
current STS-DVR, but without the internal hard drive.19 However, as just described, 
the RS-DVR stores recorded programming remotely on centralized servers at 
Cablevision’s head-end.20 The standard digital set-top boxes already in the home 
become part of the RS-DVR system following a simple software upgrade.21 Using 
the remote control, a customer requesting to record a program triggers Cablevision’s 
system to record the program on the customer’s hard-drive storage space on 
Cablevision’s computers.22 Later, the customer can “receive playback of those programs 
13. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. The basic function of cable television is further explained using the 
example: “[I]f a Cartoon Network program is scheduled to air Monday night at 8pm, Cartoon Network 
transmits that program’s data to Cablevision and other cable companies nationwide at that time, and the 
cable companies immediately re-transmit the data to customers who subscribe to that channel.” Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 124–25.
16. Id. at 124.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 125.
19. See Stelter, supra note 2 (Like STS-DVRs, RS-DVRs enable users to record, play back programming, 
and fast-forward past advertisements.).
20. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612; see also Congressional Research Service, CRS 
Report for Congress, Cartoon network LP v. CSC HoLdingS, inC.: Remote-Storage Digital 
Video Recorders and Copyright Law 3 (Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter CRS Report]. The RS-DVR 
“is designed so that each user creates and views separate copies of each television program that 
Cablevision broadcasts.” Id. “[I]f 1000 customers elect to record the February 25th 9:00 p.m. showing of 
Desperate Housewives, 1000 separate and distinct copies of that specific showing are made, each copy 
uniquely associated by identifiers with the set-top box of the customer who made the copy.” Declaration 
of Stephanie Mitchko in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Civ. 2990).
21. See Stelter, supra note 2.
22. See CRS Report, supra note 20, at 4.
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through their home television sets.”23 Cablevision charges subscribers an “additional 
fee” for their use of the RS-DVR.24
 Cablevision notified content providers of its plan to roll out the RS-DVR 
service,25 however, it failed to obtain licenses from its content providers to reproduce 
and transmit the providers’ programming.26 On May 24, 2006, a consortium of major 
film studios and television networks (collectively “plaintiffs”)27 brought a copyright 
infringement action in the District Court against Cablevision.28 Plaintiffs, the 
owners of numerous copyrighted entertainment programs,29 alleged that Cablevision 
violated two of their exclusive rights under the Copyright Act: first, that the 
unauthorized copies made by Cablevision violated plaintiffs’ right to reproduce their 
programming, and second, that the unauthorized transmissions of plaintiffs’ 
programming violated plaintiffs’ right to perform the work publicly.30 Plaintiffs 
sought a declaratory judgment that Cablevision infringed their copyrights and an 
injunction to prevent the roll-out of RS-DVR without proper licenses.31
 The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and 
permanently enjoined Cablevision from rolling out the proposed RS-DVR service.32 
The court found that as a matter of law, Cablevision’s active role in “the copying of 
programming to the RS-DVR’s . . . servers” violated plaintiffs’ exclusive right of 
reproduction under the Copyright Act.33 Furthermore, the court held that the buffering 
used by the RS-DVR created a “copy” for purposes of the Copyright Act and its 
aggregate effect could “hardly be called de minimis.”34
23. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
24. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
25. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
26. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
27. Paul Sweeting, Studios Move to Block Cablevision DVR Service, Video Business, May 29, 2006 (“The 
studio plaintiffs in the case are 20th Century Fox, Universal, Paramount and Disney. They’re joined by 
broadcasters NBC, ABC and CBS.”).
28. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
29. Id. at 610 (programming includes “movies, television series, news and sports shows, and cartoons, which 
are shown on television and also used (or licensed for use) in other media, including the Internet, DVDs, 
and cellular phone technology”).
30. Id. at 617. The Copyright Act of 1976 grants “copyright owners the exclusive rights to, among other 
things, ‘reproduce the copyrighted work in copies’ and ‘in the case of . . . audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly.’” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (4) (2006)).
31. Twentieth Century Fox, F. Supp. 2d at 609. It is also important to note that, by stipulation, the plaintiffs 
agreed to assert only a claim of direct copyright infringement, thus excluding contributory and vicarious 
liability, while Cablevision agreed not to assert a “fair use” defense. See id. at 616. Those issues were not 
litigated, although their inclusion would certainly have affected the court’s analysis.
32. Id. at 624 (prohibiting Cablevision “from (1) copying plaintiffs’ copyrighted works and (2) engaging in 
public performance of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, unless it obtains licenses to do so.”).
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id. “Under the Copyright Act, ‘copies’ are defined as: [M]aterial objects . . . in which a work is fixed by 
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or 
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 Hammering the final nails into Cablevision’s coffin, the District Court held that 
Cablevision engaged in public performance of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works during 
the RS-DVR playback transmission, “thereby infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act.”35 The court placed an RS-DVR playback squarely within 
the plain language of the transmit clause contained within the Copyright Act’s 
definition of public performance36 and likened Cablevision to service providers whose 
transmissions of recorded programming were held to be unauthorized public 
performances.37 Cablevision subsequently appealed the District Court’s decision to 
the Second Circuit.38
 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Cablevision’s RS-DVR did not directly 
infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.39 Focusing first on the 
question of whether the buffering of data reproduced the copyrighted works, the 
court concluded that the buffering performed by the RS-DVR does not create copies 
since the works “are embodied in the buffer for only a transitory period,” and 
therefore, are not “fixed.”40 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ theory of direct 
infringement, holding that Cablevision was not directly liable for “copies produced 
by the RS-DVR system,” as the copies were “made by the RS-DVR customer,” not 
Cablevision.41
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .” Id. (citing 17 
U.S.C. § 101). Cablevision argued that “[t]he buffer copies . . . cannot be considered infringing copies 
because they are ‘not fixed’ and are ‘otherwise de minimis.’” Id. (quoting Brief of CSC Holdings, Inc., 
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1480)). The 
District Court disagreed and concluded that the buffer copies are “capable of being reproduced,” and “in 
the aggregate, comprise the whole of plaintiffs’ programming.” Id.
35. Id. at 624.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a public performance to include either: (1) a performance at a place open to the 
public or where a substantial gathering of persons other than family and acquaintances is gathered, or (2) 
a transmission of a performance to the public, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance receive it in the same place at the same time or in separate places at different times).
37. See 478 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (noting that “where the relationship between the party sending a transmission 
and party receiving it is commercial . . . the transmission is one made ‘to the public’” (quoting On 
Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991))). Accord, 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (allowing video 
rental store patrons “in-store rental” service in the privacy of a small booth was a transmission made to 
the public).
38. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121.
39. Id. at 123.
40. Id. at 130 (internal quotations omitted). Rejecting the District Court’s analysis, prior case law, and the 
Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report, the court read the plain language of the Copyright Act’s 
definition of “fixed” to impose “two distinct, but related requirements: the work must be embodied in a 
medium” (embodiment requirement) “for a period of more than transitory duration” (duration 
requirement). Id. at 127. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to read the “transitory 
duration” language out of the statute. Id. at 128.
41. Id. at 133. The Second Circuit refused to broaden the boundaries of direct liability and hold Cablevision 
directly liable on the facts of this case. Id. at 132–33. The court’s reasoning behind that decision centers 
around the Supreme Court’s doctrine of contributory liability in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
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 Finally, the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether Cablevision 
“‘transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public.’”42 Reading the 
plain language of the transmit clause of section 101 of the Copyright Act, the court 
concluded that proper determination of whether a given transmission is “to the 
public” requires an examination of the potential audience of that transmission.43 The 
court reasoned that because each “transmission is made to a single subscriber using a 
single unique copy produced by that subscriber,” the potential audience of an RS-DVR 
playback transmission is limited to the single subscriber, and thus, “such transmissions 
are not performances ‘to the public.’”44
 The Second Circuit’s reasoning is f lawed for three reasons. First, the court’s 
interpretation of the Copyright Act’s definition of “public performance” departs from 
the statutory language and from prior Circuit Court decisions interpreting the same 
provisions. Second, the court abandoned its pragmatic style of reasoning used with 
respect to the reproduction issue, holding in favor of a strict, formalistic approach to 
the public-performance issue. Lastly, the court’s holding legitimizes an inefficient 
use of technology as an end-run around copyright liability.
 A proper analysis begins with a fundamental question: What is the purpose of 
copyright law? The answer may help to illustrate the f laws in the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that RS-DVR playback transmissions do not infringe the copyright 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1984). Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132–33. The stipulation 
between the parties in the instant case took the issue of contributory liability off the table, thus the 
court left the issue for another day, noting that the doctrine “stands ready to provide adequate protection 
to copyrighted works.” Id. at 132.
42. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 for its definition of “public performance”) 
(alteration in original).
43. Id. at 135. The second clause, or the “transmit clause,” of the Copyright Act’s public performance 
definition, explains:
 [T]o perform . . . a work “publicly” means . . . to transmit or otherwise communicate a 
performance . . . of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means 
of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times.
 Id. at 134 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). The court supported its reading of the “transmit clause” with a 
recount of the Copyright Act’s legislative history, starting with the House Report on the 1976 Copyright 
Act:
 [U]nder the bill, as under the present law, a performance made available by transmission 
to the public at large is “public” even though the recipients are not gathered in a single 
place, and even if there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was operating his 
receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission. The same principles apply whenever 
the potential recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such 
as occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable television service.
 Id. at 135 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 64–65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678). 
The court also discussed a 1967 House Report referenced by the plaintiffs, stating, “the same principles 
apply where the transmission is ‘capable of reaching different recipients at different times, as in the case of 
sounds or images stored in an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the 
initiative of individual members of the public.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, at 29 (1967)).
44. Id. at 139 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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owners’ exclusive right to public performance. There has been vast debate over the 
philosophical underpinnings of copyright law.45 In the United States, an economic or 
utilitarian theory prevails.46 Our Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries.”47 Under this theory, the ultimate goal of copyright law is to balance 
incentives for the creation of artistic works and the public availability of such works.48 
In accordance with this rationale, Congress has granted copyright owners a bundle 
of exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, without which artistic works would be 
under-produced.49
45. Robert Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 390 (4th ed. 
2007) (citing Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L. J. 
517 (1990) (tracing roots of natural law in American copyright law) and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 350–53 (1988) (suggesting various strains of the personhood 
justification in American copyright law)).
46. See William F. Patry, 1 Patry on Copyright § 1:1 (2009) (“Copyright in the United States is not a 
property right, much less a natural right. Instead, it is a statutory tort, created by positive law for 
utilitarian purposes: to promote the progress of science.”).
47. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (popularly known as the “Copyright and Patent Clause”).
48. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Justice Potter Stewart described 
the Copyright Act’s underlying purpose as follows:
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited 
copyright duration required by the Constitution, ref lects a balance of competing claims 
upon the public interest: [c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of 
literature, music, and the other arts.
 The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good.
 Id. (footnotes omitted).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Act grants the copyright owner:
[T]he exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission.
 Id.
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 Under the economic theory, copyright law has evolved from the owner’s right in 
a physical copy of a work to the owner’s exclusive control over the right to copy the 
work.50 Thus, copyright law in the United States places a great deal of significance 
on the term “copy,” as the basic unit of copyright.51 The term “copy” has come to 
mean “the material object in which the [owner’s] intellectual property [is] embodied,” 
as well as the “legal determination of whether the copyright ha[s] been infringed—
whether the defendant’s work [is] a copy of the plaintiff ’s.”52
 It was the Second Circuit’s formalistic approach to addressing the legal significance 
of a “copy” in the context of the public performance right that permitted the court to 
hold that Cablevision’s RS-DVR “would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ rights under 
the Copyright Act.”53 The RS-DVR system makes a copy of a work and transmits that 
copy to the subscriber.54 Prior courts considering on-demand performances via separate 
transmissions have held that the copyright owner’s public performance right had been 
infringed.55 It is puzzling that the Cartoon Network court came to the opposite 
conclusion, finding that this transmission is a non-infringing use.56
 In the case of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, the Copyright Act 
protects the owner’s right to publicly perform the work.57 As defined by the Act, to 
perform a work “publicly” means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where 
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device 
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at 
the same time or at different times.58
In Cartoon Network, the parties agreed that clause (1) was not implicated, and as 
such, the Second Circuit focused solely on the issue of “whether [the] facts satisf[ied] 
the second, ‘transmit clause’ of the public performance definition.”59 Cablevision 
50. See 3 Patry, supra note 46, § 8:1.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123.
54. Id. at 137–38.
55. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984); On Command 
Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
56. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
58. Id. § 101.
59. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134.
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argued that the customer, not Cablevision, transmits the performance and, in the 
alternative, that the playback transmission is not made “to the public.”60 The court 
chose not to address Cablevision’s first argument in full, and instead focused its 
inquiry on whether the RS-DVR playback transmission is made to the public.61 
Although the phrase “to the public” is not expressly defined by the Act, the court’s 
analysis of the statutory language considered the potential audience of a given 
transmission or “who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a 
performance.”62 Thus, the Second Circuit framed the issue in a way that allowed it to 
depart from the pragmatic reasoning it applied to the reproduction issue,63 and 
instead, to hone in on a formalistic distinction between RS-DVR and other 
on-demand video services—that the RS-DVR playback transmission is made to one 
subscriber using a unique, distinct copy made by that subscriber.64
 The Second Circuit’s holding that acts of buffering in the operation of the 
RS-DVR do not create copies is an atypical interpretation of the fixation requirement 
of the reproduction right,65 and one that introduces a sense of pragmatism into an 
area of law riddled with formalistic analyses. Seventeen years ago, in MAI Systems 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that software loaded into a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”) “is 
‘sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration,’” and thus fixed for the 
purposes of the Copyright Act.66 MAI Systems, with its so-called RAM doctrine 
interpretation of the fixation requirement, has been criticized for being at odds with 
congressional intent.67 Nevertheless, numerous courts have applied MAI Systems 
60. Id.
61. Id. The court’s holding rendered Cablevision’s first argument moot. See id. Even if the court had assumed 
that Cablevision does, in fact, make the playback transmission, the court concluded, “the RS-DVR 
playback, as described here, does not involve the transmission of a performance ‘to the public.’” Id.
62. Id. at 135 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 66–76.
64. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137. Compare id., with Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159, and On Command 
Video, 777 F. Supp. at 790 (both stating that defendants showed the same copy of a work repeatedly to 
different members of the public).
65. The Copyright Act states, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment 
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
66. 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
67. See, e.g., 3 Patry, supra note 46, § 9:63 (discussing the legislative history of the definition of “fixed”). 
Patry notes, “[t]he legislative history shows Congress wished to exclude from protection (and therefore 
from being infringed) ‘evanescent or transient reproductions . . . captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ 
of a computer.’” Id. Patry also points out the irony of the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous reasoning of the 
RAM Doctrine:
 It is with the greatest irony . . . that the definition of ‘fixed’ has been used to render 
infringing acts that Congress wished to exclude from the ambit of the Act. There is not 
the slightest indication that Congress intended to inhibit courts from doing what they 
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strictly, and have consistently held that the act of loading data into RAM constitutes 
copyright infringement.68
 However, the Second Circuit took a different approach. The court read the 
Copyright Act’s definition of the term “fixed” to impose two distinct but related 
requirements: “embodiment” and “duration.”69 The court pointed out that MAI 
Systems and its progeny “conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without addressing 
the duration requirement,” and therefore, “[these cases] do not speak to the issues 
squarely before [the court].”70 Thus, the court construed the RAM doctrine to mean 
“that loading a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program,” 
and not, as a matter of law, that it “always results in copying.”71 Applying this two-
part requirement, the court held that the works are embodied in the buffer, but 
“[g]iven that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2 seconds before being 
automatically overwritten, . . . the works here are not ‘embodied’ in the buffers for a 
period of more than transitory duration, and are therefore not ‘fixed’ in the buffers.”72 
The result of this holding is that data that pass through the RS-DVR buffers do not 
create copies under the Copyright Act’s definition of the term.73
 Indeed, the Second Circuit appears to have employed a theory about copyright 
law in the digital age that has been raised by legal scholars—the practical effect of 
the MAI Systems RAM doctrine, which sets “the basic compensable unit of copyright 
(which is also the basic infringing unit) at the ephemeral RAM copy,” is that it 
implicates the fundamental operation of a digital device that operates with a buffer.74 
have always done: adapt, in a common-sense, common-law way, infringement analysis 
to the purposes of the Copyright Act, the technologies involved, and the economic 
value of the activity . . . .
 Id.
68. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (citing Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 
F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (loading of software into RAM is “copying”); Triad Sys. Corp. v. 
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); MAI Sys. Corp. V. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Marobie-FL., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire 
Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177–78 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (downloading of file from website 
constitutes “copying” by host computer, where portions of file pass through RAM before being 
immediately transmitted over Internet)).
69. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127. (“[T]he work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium 
such that it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the ‘embodiment requirement’), and 
it must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ (the ‘duration requirement’).” 
(citing 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.02[B][3], at 8-32 
(2007))). “Unless both requirements are met, the work is not ‘fixed’ in the buffer, and, as a result, the 
buffer data is not a ‘copy’ of the original work whose data is buffered.” Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 128.
72. Id. at 130.
73. Id.
74. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 28 (Prometheus Books) (2001). It has been said that incidental 
buffering and caching that occurs in Internet and other digital transmissions should be well outside of 
MAI ’s reach. 3 Patry, supra note 46, § 9:63. The fact is:
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This is tantamount to finding all individuals to be copyright infringers, since the 
digital devices we use everyday, from computers to digital video camcorders to digital 
televisions, all utilize transient data buffers.75 The court’s novel approach to this issue 
is a rational step towards updating the RAM doctrine for the digital age.76
 The Second Circuit’s pragmatism did not bleed into the reasoning of its “public 
performance” holding. The court held that nothing in the RS-DVR playback 
transmission infringed the public performance right because Cablevision “only makes 
transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber.”77 The effect of 
this formalistic holding is that a service provider can transmit a copyrighted work to 
a subscriber without infringing the public performance right, provided that the 
transmission uses a unique copy made by that subscriber. Had the court adopted an 
approach suggested by legal scholars, the infringement analysis would have addressed 
the practical effects of Cablevision’s actions on the copyright owners’ opportunities 
for “commercial exploitation.”78 Moreover, if the Second Circuit had tracked the 
language and followed the reasoning of prior cases dealing with the public 
performance right, the outcome may not have been as favorable to Cablevision.
 The court relied on Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc. to support 
its belief that the existence and use of distinct copies in the transmit clause analysis is 
controlling.79 In Redd Horne, the defendant video rental store offered private viewing 
booths to its patrons.80 The court concluded that the defendant violated the transmit 
clause by showing “the same copy of a work seriatim” to different members of the 
 [C]aching and buffering is not viewable or hearable by consumers, usually consists of 
extremely small amounts of data, is a function of the manner in which digital 
transmissions occur rather than being a volitional act, and have no independent 
economic value. . . . Yet, the allegation that buffering and caching represents an 
infringing reproduction has served to retard severely lawful online distribution of 
music, providing music publishers and record labels with undeserved windfalls and 
leverage in litigation. It is well past time for the courts to put an end to such efforts.
 Id.
75. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (“All digital devices . . . utilize transient data buffers, 
which are regions of memory that temporarily hold data.”).
76. The court’s holding seems to echo the idea that current copyright law may not be suited for the digital 
age. In response to the exposure to liability under the RAM doctrine for “the activities of everyone, 
everywhere,” using a digital device, Professor Litman suggests that “we stop defining copyright in terms 
of reproduction,” and instead, “recast[] copyright as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation.” 
Litman, supra note 74, at 180. Under this approach “[m]aking money . . . from someone else’s work 
without permission would be infringement, as would large-scale interference with the copyright holders’ 
opportunities to do so.” Id.
77. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137.
78. The “commercial exploitation” approach, suggested by Professor Litman, is discussed supra note 76.
79. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138.
80. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 156–57. The store, Maxwell’s Video Showcase, offered an “in-store rental” 
service, which allowed patrons to view any of an assortment of video cassettes in the privacy of a small 
booth. Id. Each booth contained seats and a television. Id. at 157. To view a film, the patron would pay 
a fee based on the number of people viewing and the time of day, select a film from the catalogue, and 
enter the assigned viewing booth. Id. Once the door was closed, a Maxwell’s employee would load the 
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public.81 As noted by the Second Circuit, this reasoning begs the question, why does 
the use of the same copy affect the transmit clause inquiry?82 According to the Second 
Circuit, “the use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a transmission,” 
and therefore, because the RS-DVR playback transmission uses a copy made by the 
subscriber, there is no infringement.83 This reasoning ignores the practical effects of 
Cablevision’s actions and instead focuses on a superficial factual distinction.
 Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected the District Court’s reliance on On 
Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,84 in which the defendant had 
developed a system for electronic delivery of motion picture video tapes to hotel 
guest rooms.85 In On Command Video, the court held that the defendant’s system 
transmitted “movie performances directly under the language of the [statutory] 
definition,”86 and concluded that such transmissions were made to the public “because 
the relationship between the transmitter of the performance, On Command, and the 
audience, hotel guests, is a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing 
takes place.”87 The Second Circuit in Cartoon Network interpreted On Command to 
hold that “any commercial transmission is a transmission ‘to the public,’” and is 
therefore untenable because it contradicts Congress’ intent behind the Copyright 
Act.88 This broad interpretation ignores the economic justification of copyright and 
the “commercial exploitation” approach.89
 The Second Circuit concluded that the RS-DVR playback transmission to a 
single subscriber, using a single unique copy created by the subscriber, is not a 
performance “to the public” for purposes of the Copyright Act.90 However, 
Cablevision’s actions—the transmissions of multiple, unlicensed copies to its 
subscribers—had a direct negative effect on the copyright owners’ opportunities for 
video cassette into a bank of VCRs at the front of the store and the film would be transmitted to the 
patron’s viewing booth. Id.
81. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138. The Redd Horne court relied on Professor Nimmer’s treatise: “‘if the 
same copy . . . of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different members of the public, 
albeit at different times, this constitutes a ‘public’ performance.” Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159 (quoting 2 
Nimmer & Nimmer, § 8.14[C][3], at 8-142).
82. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 139.
85. On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. at 788. The system, centrally located in the hotel equipment room, 
directed a bank of video cassette players to transmit a particular motion picture to a particular guest’s 
room once the guest selected the motion picture from the menu of available titles. Id. While in use, the 
motion picture was available for viewing only in the room where it was selected. Id. Once the motion 
picture finished, it was rewound and immediately made available for viewing by another guest. Id.
86. Id. at 789.
87. Id. at 790.
88. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
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“commercial exploitation” of their content. As noted by one amici, “[t]he value of a 
creative work in the entertainment industry is based on revenues earned during 
discrete windows of exploitation . . . .”91 A copyrighted work, whether motion picture 
or television series, is “commercially exploited” in subsequent markets following the 
initial broadcast.92 Giving subscribers the ability to record such a large amount of 
content and store it for an indefinite amount of time undermines the need for other 
licensed uses such as DVD release, streaming Internet video, and video-on-demand 
services.93
 Furthermore, by finding in Cablevision’s favor, the Second Circuit legitimized 
an inefficient use of technology. This point does not suggest that all network-DVR 
systems are inefficient. Indeed, it is the future of consumer television “time-shifting” 
technology and its introduction brings various societal benefits.94 However, 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system was not designed with technological progress in 
mind—it was designed to avoid copyright liability.95 Under the Second Circuit’s 
91. Brief of Screen Actors Guild, Inc. & Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at *6, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., No. 08-448, 2008 WL 4843616, 
at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2008).
92. See id. The amicus brief presented examples of how the motion picture market functions:
 [T]he typical life cycle of a theatrical motion picture would include a window of 
theatrical release, followed by a release to DVD and pay-per-view, then pay television 
(including video-on-demand), and finally broadcast and/or cable television. It might 
also be made available for licensed download on the Internet concurrently with or 
between other windows. Some windows will overlap and some will be revisited later in 
the work’s lifetime, either through existing licenses or new ones.
 Id. (footnote omitted). The television market follows a nearly identical path:
 A typical television series will run first on a television or cable network and might 
re-run multiple times within that same season. A recent practice is for episodes of the 
series to be available for viewing on the Internet—either ad-supported or through paid 
downloads—as early as the next day following its first run. A successful series will 
eventually be syndicated to other broadcast or cable channels. Frequently, television 
series, whether successful or just well-received, are released to DVD.
 Id. at n.5.
93. See id. at *11–12 (arguing that RS-DVR is a commercial, subscription-based service that requires an 
on-going relationship between Cablevision and its subscribers, more akin to video-on-demand than to a 
VCR). Thus, by usurping the plaintiffs’ opportunity to exploit these subsequent markets without paying 
the license fees, “Cablevision has unjustly enriched itself.” Id. at 12.
94. See Shields, supra note 3 (predicting that network DVRs “‘would immediately make time-shifting 
technology available to 40 [percent] to 50 percent of a cable operator’s subscribers . . . .’” (quoting Magna 
Global)); Hall, supra note 3 (noting that network DVRs would store and routinely back up recorded 
programming on a remote and “industrial strength” server, “eliminating the need to install and maintain 
noisy, heat-generating and less reliable DVR boxes in the home”); Stelter, supra note 2 (predicting that 
network DVR would “prop open the door to new methods of advertising”). Network DVR would also 
lower the cable company’s DVR operating costs, and that cost saving would be passed on to subscribers. 
See Hall, supra note 3.
95. Cablevision designed the RS-DVR “to provide subscribers with their own dedicated hard-disk space in 
the headend” and argued to the Second Circuit “that because of this architecture, the network-based 
system was no different than conventional set-top DVRs.” Todd Spangler, Network DVR Plans Come 
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“public performance” holding, to pass muster, network DVR systems must make 
individual copies of content and associate one unique copy with each subscriber. 
Accordingly, in order to support RS-DVR for 50,000 subscribers, Cablevision “would 
need almost 4,000 Terabytes to provide 80 Gigabytes of recording space” for each 
subscriber.96 This is simply inefficient. For instance, instead of storing 50,000 copies, 
one per subscriber, of last night’s episode of LOST, it would be more efficient for 
Cablevision to maintain one shared and licensed copy of popular content to stream to 
subscribers.97
 Finally, the Second Circuit’s holding may provide a blueprint for future content-
delivery networks to avoid copyright liability by emulating Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
system. Not only will the other major cable television companies follow suit,98 but 
what is to prevent online service providers that offer subscription-based streaming 
from designing a similar architecture? The Second Circuit’s formalistic holding 
relieves transmitters of unlicensed copyrighted content from infringing on the “public 
performance” right. Liability is avoided, so long as a content delivery network either 
makes copies of each content item and associates one unique copy with each 
subscriber, or gives subscribers the capacity to make their own individual copies. The 
court itself seems to acknowledge the risky implications of its decision by limiting 
the holding to the facts of the case.99
 In summary, the Second Circuit’s reasoning of the “public performance” holding 
is f lawed. The court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act’s definition of “public 
performance” departs from the statutory language and prior Circuit Court decisions 
interpreting the same provisions. By focusing on the recipient of each transmission 
and holding in favor of a strict, formalistic approach to the public performance issue, 
Out of Cold Storage, Multichannel News, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/134269-
Network_DVR_Plans_Come_Out_of_Cold_Storage.php.
96. Id. This is far more storage than that required by video-on-demand, “which store only one physical copy 
of a video file and then streams it to many subscribers.” Id.
97. See id. A spokesman for a video-on-demand vendor believes a more efficient shared-storage model will 
be developed, stating, “I think what will happen is, people will realize that you don’t have to force 
everyone to have different copies of the same program.” Id. Ironically, forcing subscribers to have distinct 
copies of the same program is what allowed Cablevision to prevail in this case. Had RS-DVR been 
designed on a shared-storage model, the outcome of the public performance issue would likely have 
been different.
98. Id. (predicting that “cable operators would be likely to initially deploy a network DVR service that 
closely hews to the way Cablevision described its Remote Storage DVR in court documents, to be on 
the safe side of the law”).
99. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139–40.
 This holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content delivery networks 
to avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating 
one unique copy with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the 
capacity to make their own individual copies. We do not address whether such a 
network operator would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such as 
liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory infringement.
 Id.
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the court departed from the pragmatic reasoning it applied to the reproduction issue. 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR playback transmissions used distinct copies for each subscriber 
made by that subscriber, and are therefore deemed not to be “public performances.” 
This formalistic interpretation highlights the struggles of copyright law in the digital 
age. As a result of the court’s holding, Cablevision’s inefficient RS-DVR system 
design may become the blueprint for an end-run around copyright liability.
